The hybris of strategic analysis

on vacation. thinking about life etc.

dissatisfied with our field - strategic research.
failed massively time after time - little sign of change
foresight
also on strategic advice
I have always felt that we as a professional group assume a unique position in strategic policymaking. With that position - I feel - also come great responsibilities. I have heard a number of my colleagues refer to the 'right to be irresponsible'. Often in a semi-jocular way, typically to ingratiate themselves in the presence of policymakers ("we know where we stand - we come up with the ideas, you are the ones who pick and therefore also are responsible"). But such statements have always struck me as extremely disingenuous.

I have been impressed with the almost painful self-reflection that is occurring right now in the field of economics.
But whereas economists are reviewing some of the basic tenets and tools of their profession'
The economics profession is heading into years of turmoil that will be tremendously beneficial for academics, particularly young people who can help invent the new theories and ideas.
(just like Great Depression (Keynesiansim) and again inflation in the 70s (Chicago School) led to major changes in economics )

problems:


Foresight
Humans - and especially strategic decisionmakers - seem to have an almost insatiable thirst for predictions of the future. Despite the fact that our collective record on this score is dismal we as a profession still gladly participate in the hoax of prediction. Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, our profession continues to claim that we have some privileged insights into what the future might bring. that pundits - partly at the request of our customers, but mostly driven by our own intellectual hybris (so no excuses)
The forest vs the trees
To me 'strategy' is about the 'big picture'. And yet I am continuously amazed at how rarely we as a profession engage in the 'big picture' analysis that should be the heart of strategic analysis. The market for 'big picture' issues is typically fairly small - in the public sector as well as in the private sector, for 'small' actors as well as for 'big' ones.  Even the US, which outspends all other nations on various forms of policy analysis in our field, has no real money allocated for this: the research money flows through the (very stovepiped) departments whereas the inter-agency process does deal with some big-picture issues but has no money to spend on research. We as a profession are therefore often asked about the trees (in 'our' neck of the woods) and forget about the forest.

The fallibility of data sets

I have never understood why the economics pages of (quality) newpapers are filled with rich (near real-time) datasets whereas the 'world' pages tend to be filled with mostly pictures and discursive text.  The situation in the academic world is not much different - the datasets 

The  accept 'data' at face value - most of us realize that we should (and can) do better, but we take the easy way out  

• most of the datasets (on economics, on conflict, etc.) we have are flawed - most of us realize this, but we all happily throw out the caveats and use the  
• we do not have data on many of the things we would like (/need) to know 
• we almost never do our homework on security/defense/foreign policy analysis. Every textbook on policy analysis (and more importantly - just plain common sense) suggests that

Technological backwardness

We live in an age 

we are technologically backwards - how can one explain that the new methods to 'datamine' the 'big data' that our increasingly ubiquitous (some have called it 'panoptic') sensors are collecting  are being used more for customer relationship management by private businesses than by the highest-level political decisionmakers on issues of strategic importance
Downside vs upside risk
As a profession we seem to wallow in gloom and doom. We observe youth bulges in certain part of the world and immediately think of ticking time bombs and trouble - instead of (also) seeing a growing demand for freedom, dignity and 'normalcy' that offers unprecedented (security) opportunities.    
Elitism 

• we sustain the 'elitist' (and deterministic) approach to strategy  

Protectionism
For some reason I find quite inexplicable, the security community tends to end up in the camp that opposes free trade and the free flow of factors of production. Many old crass mercantilist arguments against free trade are now largely out of vogue. Nobody argues any more, as the predecessors of the current 'realists' claimed, that trade sapped the vital juices of a nation (bullion)  

 When we look at migration, we see all sorts of threats in the guise of fifth columns, sectoral violence, destabilizing flows, and we largely ignore the various beneficial effects that migration has had throughout history.

• we struggle to retain our (intellectual/political/financial) independence  
• [on the upside] we are are strategically fairly irrelevant - although we (as a profession) are unfortunately relevant enough to throw the lives on many people in the balance  
• we have ignored costs

no bonus without malus

If there is one thing I agree on with the 'gloom and doom boom' crowd', then it is that we live at a crucial juncture in time. Yes, power is changing - but my sense is that it is changing in a much more profound way than the people who talk about power shifts claim. And this more structural power shift also offers a whole set of new opportunities.