I have referred in this blog multiple times to the growing unease - among military and non-military people alike - about our current capability portfolio. I think the discussions about the term 'kinetic capabilities' are an interesting example of this debate. My own take in this debate for the past few years has been that we just need a better balance between 'kinetic' and 'non-kinetic' capabilities. Upon reflection, I will now start talking about 'old kinetic' (industrial) and 'new kinetic' (information-age) capabilities.
Monday, February 13, 2012
Friday, October 28, 2011
Ecosystem (forward) innovation
- This is a little blurb I wrote with some personal ideas on the debate on innovation which we are having within TNO through our new Strategy and Change program. The reason I am posting it here (besides the fact that I have no real time to work it out into a real publication anyway) is that some of this thinking also fits in very nicely with the much more broader and far-sighted approach to 'armed force' that I am pleading for in this blog.
Post-ismism
- I have never understood why so many defense and security analysts typically come out on the mercantilist/protectionist side of so many of the 'big' political economy questions.
- It seems to me that we are finally (albeit painstakingly gradually) starting to transcend the 'ism'-debates
- (what I sometimes jokingly call 'ismism') in the field of International Relations Theory, that are amusingly debated in a recent issues of International Studies Quarterly. Yet there can be little doubt that the isms still persist, and perhaps nowhere more than in the field of defense and security analysis, which for some bizarre reason has always tended to be dominated by what is know - in one of the most spectacular misnomers of all time - as the 'realist' camp. Not hindered by much knowledge about international political economy (or frankly - of modern international history), this field has always displayed a remarkably persistent tendency to ignore the powerful linkages between the various dimensions of the international system (of course economics, but also demographic, legal, sociological, etc.). And in those instances where it DID take some of them into consideration (like economics), to interpret those in an almost caricature-like 'vulgar' realist way. In the much more 'linear' and less interconnected world, relative growth rates could indeed be interpreted
Wednesday, July 20, 2011
The hybris of strategic analysis
on vacation. thinking about life etc.
dissatisfied with our field - strategic research.
failed massively time after time - little sign of change
foresight
also on strategic advice
I have always felt that we as a professional group assume a unique position in strategic policymaking. With that position - I feel - also come great responsibilities. I have heard a number of my colleagues refer to the 'right to be irresponsible'. Often in a semi-jocular way, typically to ingratiate themselves in the presence of policymakers ("we know where we stand - we come up with the ideas, you are the ones who pick and therefore also are responsible"). But such statements have always struck me as extremely disingenuous.
I have been impressed with the almost painful self-reflection that is occurring right now in the field of economics.
But whereas economists are reviewing some of the basic tenets and tools of their profession'
The economics profession is heading into years of turmoil that will be tremendously beneficial for academics, particularly young people who can help invent the new theories and ideas.
(just like Great Depression (Keynesiansim) and again inflation in the 70s (Chicago School) led to major changes in economics )
problems:
Foresight
Humans - and especially strategic decisionmakers - seem to have an almost insatiable thirst for predictions of the future. Despite the fact that our collective record on this score is dismal we as a profession still gladly participate in the hoax of prediction. Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, our profession continues to claim that we have some privileged insights into what the future might bring. that pundits - partly at the request of our customers, but mostly driven by our own intellectual hybris (so no excuses)
The forest vs the trees
To me 'strategy' is about the 'big picture'. And yet I am continuously amazed at how rarely we as a profession engage in the 'big picture' analysis that should be the heart of strategic analysis. The market for 'big picture' issues is typically fairly small - in the public sector as well as in the private sector, for 'small' actors as well as for 'big' ones. Even the US, which outspends all other nations on various forms of policy analysis in our field, has no real money allocated for this: the research money flows through the (very stovepiped) departments whereas the inter-agency process does deal with some big-picture issues but has no money to spend on research. We as a profession are therefore often asked about the trees (in 'our' neck of the woods) and forget about the forest.
dissatisfied with our field - strategic research.
failed massively time after time - little sign of change
foresight
also on strategic advice
I have always felt that we as a professional group assume a unique position in strategic policymaking. With that position - I feel - also come great responsibilities. I have heard a number of my colleagues refer to the 'right to be irresponsible'. Often in a semi-jocular way, typically to ingratiate themselves in the presence of policymakers ("we know where we stand - we come up with the ideas, you are the ones who pick and therefore also are responsible"). But such statements have always struck me as extremely disingenuous.
I have been impressed with the almost painful self-reflection that is occurring right now in the field of economics.
But whereas economists are reviewing some of the basic tenets and tools of their profession'
The economics profession is heading into years of turmoil that will be tremendously beneficial for academics, particularly young people who can help invent the new theories and ideas.
(just like Great Depression (Keynesiansim) and again inflation in the 70s (Chicago School) led to major changes in economics )
problems:
Foresight
Humans - and especially strategic decisionmakers - seem to have an almost insatiable thirst for predictions of the future. Despite the fact that our collective record on this score is dismal we as a profession still gladly participate in the hoax of prediction. Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, our profession continues to claim that we have some privileged insights into what the future might bring. that pundits - partly at the request of our customers, but mostly driven by our own intellectual hybris (so no excuses)
The forest vs the trees
To me 'strategy' is about the 'big picture'. And yet I am continuously amazed at how rarely we as a profession engage in the 'big picture' analysis that should be the heart of strategic analysis. The market for 'big picture' issues is typically fairly small - in the public sector as well as in the private sector, for 'small' actors as well as for 'big' ones. Even the US, which outspends all other nations on various forms of policy analysis in our field, has no real money allocated for this: the research money flows through the (very stovepiped) departments whereas the inter-agency process does deal with some big-picture issues but has no money to spend on research. We as a profession are therefore often asked about the trees (in 'our' neck of the woods) and forget about the forest.
The fallibility of data sets
I have never understood why the economics pages of (quality) newpapers are filled with rich (near real-time) datasets whereas the 'world' pages tend to be filled with mostly pictures and discursive text. The situation in the academic world is not much different - the datasets
The accept 'data' at face value - most of us realize that we should (and can) do better, but we take the easy way out
- most of the datasets (on economics, on conflict, etc.) we have are flawed - most of us realize this, but we all happily throw out the caveats and use the
- we do not have data on many of the things we would like (/need) to know
- we almost never do our homework on security/defense/foreign policy analysis. Every textbook on policy analysis (and more importantly - just plain common sense) suggests that
We live in an age
we are technologically backwards - how can one explain that the new methods to 'datamine' the 'big data' that our increasingly ubiquitous (some have called it 'panoptic') sensors are collecting are being used more for customer relationship management by private businesses than by the highest-level political decisionmakers on issues of strategic importance
Downside vs upside risk
As a profession we seem to wallow in gloom and doom. We observe youth bulges in certain part of the world and immediately think of ticking time bombs and trouble - instead of (also) seeing a growing demand for freedom, dignity and 'normalcy' that offers unprecedented (security) opportunities.
Elitism
Protectionism
For some reason I find quite inexplicable, the security community tends to end up in the camp that opposes free trade and the free flow of factors of production. Many old crass mercantilist arguments against free trade are now largely out of vogue. Nobody argues any more, as the predecessors of the current 'realists' claimed, that trade sapped the vital juices of a nation (bullion)
When we look at migration, we see all sorts of threats in the guise of fifth columns, sectoral violence, destabilizing flows, and we largely ignore the various beneficial effects that migration has had throughout history.
If there is one thing I agree on with the 'gloom and doom boom' crowd', then it is that we live at a crucial juncture in time. Yes, power is changing - but my sense is that it is changing in a much more profound way than the people who talk about power shifts claim. And this more structural power shift also offers a whole set of new opportunities.
Downside vs upside risk
As a profession we seem to wallow in gloom and doom. We observe youth bulges in certain part of the world and immediately think of ticking time bombs and trouble - instead of (also) seeing a growing demand for freedom, dignity and 'normalcy' that offers unprecedented (security) opportunities.
Elitism
- we sustain the 'elitist' (and deterministic) approach to strategy
Protectionism
For some reason I find quite inexplicable, the security community tends to end up in the camp that opposes free trade and the free flow of factors of production. Many old crass mercantilist arguments against free trade are now largely out of vogue. Nobody argues any more, as the predecessors of the current 'realists' claimed, that trade sapped the vital juices of a nation (bullion)
When we look at migration, we see all sorts of threats in the guise of fifth columns, sectoral violence, destabilizing flows, and we largely ignore the various beneficial effects that migration has had throughout history.
- we struggle to retain our (intellectual/political/financial) independence
- [on the upside] we are are strategically fairly irrelevant - although we (as a profession) are unfortunately relevant enough to throw the lives on many people in the balance
- we have ignored costs
If there is one thing I agree on with the 'gloom and doom boom' crowd', then it is that we live at a crucial juncture in time. Yes, power is changing - but my sense is that it is changing in a much more profound way than the people who talk about power shifts claim. And this more structural power shift also offers a whole set of new opportunities.
Friday, May 20, 2011
Thursday, April 21, 2011
Joint Ops 2030 receives NATO's 2011 Scientific Achievement Award
The NATO Research and Technology Board, the highest authority within the NATO Research and Technology Organization, has awarded the RTO 2011 Scientific Achievement Award to the Long-Term Scientific Study on Joint Operations 2030.
My colleague Frank Bekkers and myself spent much time and effort on this study on which I have already blogged. The letter from RTB Chairman Dr. Walker states that "this Award recognizes exceptional effort in significant RTO activities, excellence and originality in the scientific and technica! content therein, as well as outstanding results in terms of military benefit.' While we are of course proud to have received this award, I want to take advantage of this occasion to share some ideas on the way in which we conduct this type of research within the Alliance.
My colleague Frank Bekkers and myself spent much time and effort on this study on which I have already blogged. The letter from RTB Chairman Dr. Walker states that "this Award recognizes exceptional effort in significant RTO activities, excellence and originality in the scientific and technica! content therein, as well as outstanding results in terms of military benefit.' While we are of course proud to have received this award, I want to take advantage of this occasion to share some ideas on the way in which we conduct this type of research within the Alliance.
Wednesday, April 13, 2011
Power and capability planning
I already mentioned - in an entry with some more personal ruminations about 'power' - that HCSS is running a project (big in scope, small in funding...) on the Nature of Power. Our interest in this was piqued from a number of different angles: our frustration with the limitations of the IR debate on these issues; our ongoing efforts to develop better data sets in the field of international relations; our fascination with the often simplistic debates about the future of power ('Decline of the West and Rise of the West' - power transition; or 'Decline of the state and rise of the non-state' - power diffusion). But it also had a powerful (pun intended) connection to the field of defence and security capability development. If our view on the nature of power is broadening - EVEN in the field on international relations (see the discussions on 'soft' and 'smart' power - shouldn't this have some implications for the way in which we conceive of - and develop - defence capabilities? Are there untapped crevasses of real power that Westerm governments and defense organizations can start exploring and maybe even developing - just as we do with other areas of more traditional kinetic power?
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